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Potential demographic dividend for India, 2001 to 2061: 
A macro-simulation projection using the spectrum model 
 
Abstract 
This paper projects potential demographic dividend for India for the period from 2001 to 2061 by using 
simulation modelling software, Spectrum 5.753 which integrates demographic and socio-economic 
changes. Two key findings, after checking their robustness, from the simulation modelling are: First, the 
effective demographic windows of opportunity for India is available for the period between 2011 and 2041, 
giving India roughly 30 years of demographic bonus. It is the period where the maximum of the first 
demographic dividend can be reaped before the ageing burden starts. Second, favourable demographic 
changes alone provide a demographic dividend of over 165,000 rupees (almost an additional 43 
percentage) in terms of GDP per capita by 2061 when integrated with supporting socio-economic policy 
environment in terms of investment in human capital, family planning, decent employment opportunities, 
the rapid pace of urbanization, and agricultural growth.  
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India is experiencing a demographic transition that has involved changes in its population size, population 
growth, and age distribution. There has been a rapid increase in its population from 358 million in 1950 to 
about 1380 million in 2020. It is expected to reach 1.7 billion by 2060 but after that, a downfall in its 
population size is projected. The population growth rate displays an inverted U-shaped pattern with a 
continuously falling population growth rate recorded since 1990-91 and projected to become negative for 
the period after 2060. These population changes are driven by declining fertility and mortality. The country’s 
Infant Mortality Rate (IMR) has declined from 181 per 1,000 live births in 1950 to 32 per 1,000 live births in 
2020 due to control over communicable diseases and lack of famines in the post-independence period, and 
it is projected to reach 5 by the end of this century. Similarly, the Total Fertility Rate (TFR) has fallen from 
5.9 children per woman in 1950 to 2.2 children per woman in 2020, almost touching the replacement level 
fertility of 2.1 children per woman. After 2050, the TFR will stabilize at 1.7 children per woman. Further, the 
country witnessed a significant rise in average life expectancy at birth (LEB) from just 37 years in the post-
independence period to 70 years in 2020 and projected to reach 81 years by the end of this century (Bloom, 
Canning, Hu, Liu, Mahal, & Yip, 2010; Bloom, 2011; James & Goli, 2016; United Nations, 2019).  
One of the major consequences of this process of demographic transition for India is the 
transformation of its age-structure of the population towards the working-age group relative to the 
dependent group (comprising of both child and old age population) which has opened a demographic 
window of opportunity for economic growth. The United Nations (2019) estimates highlight that the share 
of the working-age population in India has increased from approximately 58 percent in 2000 to reach a 
maximum of approximately nearly 64 percent in 2035 and experiencing a downfall thereafter. Further, the 
population estimates suggest that the median age of an Indian population was just 29 years in 2020 while 
in other developed countries such as the USA, Europe and Japan, it was above 40 years (National policy 
for skill development and entrepreneurship report, 2015), making it one of the ‘youngest large nations’ in 
the world. This demographic advantage can support higher economic growth for India if it is combined with 
the favourable policy environment of quality education, skills and health, and decent employment 
opportunities (Bloom, Canning, & Sevilla, 2003; Bloom, 2011; Chandrasekhar, Ghosh, & Roychwdhury, 
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2006; Goli & Pandey, 2010; James, 2008, 2011; James & Goli, 2016; Navaneetham & Dharmalingam, 
2012).  
A few studies have previously assessed the potential economic gain from fertility decline and the 
demographic window of opportunity for India (see Table 1). Despite existing evidence, there is a knowledge 
gap on the question of potential demographic dividend for India.  The previous studies estimated the 
demographic windows of opportunity by considering the period before 2000 when the country had not 
reached a favourable demographic phase, while we have estimated and projected demographic bonus from 
2001 to 2061. In this context, the main objective of this study is to present systematic documentation of 
economic returns as a result of demographic changes and the effective demographic window of opportunity 
available to India by constructing a macro-simulation model of economic growth for the period 2001-2061. 
Our simulation work is based on the robust theoretical framework and methodological approaches adopted 
by some of the earlier pioneering work in this field, such as by Coale and Hoover (1958) and later its 
extensions by Ashraf, Weil, and Wilde (2013), Karra, Canning, and Wilde (2017), and Goli, James, 
Srinivasan, Mishra, Rana, and Reddy (2021). 
This paper makes four key contributions to the existing literature:  (1) We are the first one to estimate 
the magnitude and duration of demographic dividend for India for the period 2001-2061 by employing a 
computer simulation program, Spectrum 5.753, which integrates DemProj (Demographic Projection) and 
RAPID (Resources for the Awareness of Population Impacts on Development) modules representing 
demographic and socio-economic variables respectively. (2) We make demographic projections by taking 
2001 as the base year in comparison to the earlier studies which have considered the period before 2000 
(except for the study by Goli & Pandey, 2010). Our choice of the base year is in consonance with the age-
structural transition of the country which vividly depicts the onset of favourable demographic phase only 
after 2000. (3) We parametrize the simulation modelling along the lines of Ashraf et al. (2013) and Karra et 
al. (2017) by including various possible channels of demographic-economic linkages such as labour supply 
effect (including female labour force participation effect), human capital effect, urbanization effect, Malthus 
effect, and Boserup effect through which demographic transition and a consequent change in the age-
structure of the population can affect economic growth. (4) The study computes demographic dividend for 
India by comparing GDP per capita across two demographic scenarios where no exogenous changes in 
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the demographic factors take place to the case where the demographic variables follow the United Nations 
(2019) medium variant population projection.  
The summary of the findings: First, the effective demographic windows of opportunity for India is 
available for the period between 2011 and 2041, giving it roughly 30 years of demographic bonus. It is the 
period where the maximum of the first demographic dividend can be reaped before the ageing burden 
starts. Second, the demographic emphasis scenario creates a demographic dividend of over 165,000 
rupees (almost an additional 43 percentage) in terms of GDP per capita by 2061 when compared to the 
demographic as-usual scenario, solely as a result of favourable age-structural transition and supporting 
socio-economic policy environment in terms of investment in human capital, family planning, decent 
employment opportunities, the rapid pace of urbanization, and agricultural growth.  
The rest of this paper is organized as: Section 2 provides a literature review. Section 3 deals with 
simulation strategy, including data inputs, assumptions, and methodology. Section 4 discusses results and 
Section 5 concludes.  
 
2. Literature Review 
The role of demography on economic growth by using simulation approach has been first attempted by 
Coale and Hoover (1958) by making three alternative population projections (high, medium and low) for 
India and found that a decline in fertility raises income per capita through the mechanism of capital 
accumulation. After few years, the study by Enke (1971) used a dynamic demographic-economic model to 
compare income per capita under two different projected fertility scenarios for the period 1970 – 2000. It 
concluded that a low fertility scenario supported higher income per capita. The study by Kelly (1988), 
however, cited many obstacles in building a credible demographic forecasts model due to general 
equilibrium feedbacks between demographic and economic transitions, potential changes in policy or 
institutions during the forecast period, and inadequate availability of data. As a result, the simulation models 
could not gain popularity after the mid-1980s.  
Afterwards, the simulation models regained prominence as awareness-raising models which are 
designed to reflect the positive effects of fertility decline on economic growth. The study by Ashraf et al. 
(2013) applied a dynamic simulation model to Nigeria and confirmed that a fall in fertility raises per capita 
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income by an economically significant amount. Romero (2013) used a Computable general equilibrium 
(CGE) simulation model to highlight that Taiwan’s demographic transition could explain 22 percent of per 
capita output growth for the period 1965-2005. The National Council for Population and Development and 
Health Policy Project (2014) estimated demographic dividend opportunities for Kenya by considering four 
scenarios in the DemDiv model for the period from 2010 to 2050. It highlighted that a combined scenario 
of investment in education, economic policies, and family planning would raise GDP per capita by more 
than 12 times during the period considered. Another report by Uganda’s National Planning Authority (2014) 
estimated demographic dividend for the country by taking three scenarios in the DemDiv model for the 
period from 2010 to 2040 and found that investment in education, family planning, infrastructure, and 
economic reform would help Uganda to achieve a target level of GDP (USD 9500) in 2040. In recent years, 
several studies have projected a potential demographic dividend for Nigeria arising due to demographic 
changes. To mention a few, the study by Bloom, Finlay, Humair, Mason, Olaniyan, and Soyibo (2015) found 
that the GDP of Nigeria could be 2.7 times larger in 2030 than in 2010 due to demographic dividend and 
improvement in life expectancy. Karra et al. (2017) had developed a more comprehensive demographic-
economic macro-simulation modelling framework for Nigeria under which the effects of child health 
outcomes, increase in savings, and expansion of family planning programmes were also analysed as 
additional channels through which fertility decline influences economic growth. The study confirmed larger 
economic gains resulting from fertility reduction. Lutz, Cuaresma, Kebede, Prskawetz, Sanderson, and 
Striessnig (2019) simulated GDP per capita paths for Nigeria under three different scenarios to highlight 
the importance of human capital serving as a catalyst to bring the about larger impact of age-structural 
changes on economic growth. In the context of India, the study by Goli et al. (2021) highlighted the 
cumulative benefits of family planning investments from 1991 to 2061 by considering four scenarios of 
fertility levels. The results from the simulation exercise revealed that improvement in the quality of family 
planning services, and provision of quality healthcare, education, and employment opportunities could 
provide the maximum benefits.  
In Table 1, we have summarized the estimates of the magnitude of demographic dividend and 
window of demographic opportunity from previous studies in the Indian context. These studies vary in their 
theoretical framework, methodologies adopted (such as multiple regression model, Conditional Barro 
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Convergence Model, National Transfer Accounts Method based on life-cycle approach, etc.), empirical 
specification (OLS or IV), and vector of control variables. Despite these differences, a common finding from 
these studies is that India’s window of opportunity started much before the period 2000. The exceptions 
are Bloom and Finlay (2008) and Goli and Pandey (2010) who advanced that demographic windows of 
opportunity for the country started around 2011, and became effective from 2015. The age-structural 
transition of the population of India as suggested by the United Nations (2019) reveals that the country 
reached a favourable demographic phase at the beginning of the 2000 decade. Hence, the estimation of 
demographic divided after the onset of the window of opportunity assumes greater importance.  
 
3. Simulation Strategy  
The study uses the DemProj and RAPID modules of Spectrum Suite 5.753 to estimate the magnitude and 
duration of demographic dividend for India by making demographic projections from 2001 to 2061. The 
potential demographic dividend is estimated by comparing GDP per capita across two different 
demographic scenarios in the DemProj module: (i) Demographic-As-Usual Scenario - This scenario 
presents a hypothetical case where the status quo continues, that is, the demographic variables in the 
DemProj modules are assumed to be fixed at 2001 level1. (ii) Demographic Emphasis Scenario - It 
represents a case where the demographic projections based on the United Nations (2019) medium variant 
fertility scenario2 is used for the entire period 2001 – 2061. Our estimation process of the demographic 
dividend is in line with the previous simulation exercise by National Council for Population and Development 
and Health Policy Project (2014), Uganda’s National Planning Authority (2014), Bloom et al. (2015), and 
Lutz et al. (2019). 
 Since there is nothing automatic about economic returns from demographic transition unless 
accompanied by a favourable socio-economic policy environment in the country (Bloom et al., 2003, Bloom, 
2011; Mason, 2005), we consider this fact by parametrizing the simulation modelling along the lines of 
Ashraf et al. (2013) and Karra et al. (2017) by including various possible channels of demographic-
economic linkages.  First, a shift in the age-structure of the population towards the working-age group will 
 
1 The choice of base year (2001) in Demographic-As-Usual Scenario is to match the projected and actual values of 
input indicators for the recent period. 
2 “United Nations generally consider the medium variant to be the most likely” (Spectrum Manual, 2019, p. 59). 
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increase the potential labour supply. In addition, lower fertility induces more participation of females in the 
labour market. This is described in the previous literature as the labour supply effect. Rather than assuming 
full employment in our model, we allow for some degree of unemployment since everyone will not get 
absorbed in the market. Secondly, the accumulation of human capital, that is, investment in health, 
education, and skills of the population increases as lower resources are needed to be diverted for child 
caring and rearing (referred to in the previous literature as human capital effect). Third, the rapid 
urbanization pace is also expected to contribute to economic growth due to plenty of work opportunities, 
greater availability of healthcare facilities, presence of economies of scale and learning effect in industries, 
easier transportation, and higher participation of women in the labour market due to lower fertility rates 
(referred as urbanization effect) (Bloom et al., 2003; Bloom, 2011). Next, there may be congestion of fixed 
factors such as land due to rising population pressure, which in turn affects per capita output (referred to 
as the Malthus effect). Lastly, population changes improve the productivity of the agricultural sector by 
either allowing for economies of scale or inducing technological changes (referred to as the Boserup effect) 
(Ashraf et al. 2013). The conceptual framework based on these possible channels linking demographic-
economic outcomes is shown in Figure 1. In our simulation modelling, we incorporate these channels by 
assuming the right socio-economic policy scenario in the RAPID module in terms of employment, economy, 
education, health, urbanization, and agriculture for the country. The factors which are not part of our models 
such as savings, capital accumulation, non-farm sector, labour market flexibility, Information and 
Communication Technologies use, financial market efficiency, public institutions (efficiency of governance), 
openness to international trade, and investment in basic infrastructure are assumed to be constant.  
 
Data Inputs, Assumptions, and Methodology 
Below we discuss the compilation, assumptions, and data source of each of the input indicators considered 
in each module in detail3. While compiling inputs, we have interpolated data for some of the input indicators 
 
3 It is to be noted that the inputs used in the DemProj and RAPID are inbuilt in the model, hence, leading to rigidity 




for which data was not available. Also, we have made standard goalpost assumptions for projection 
estimates to make our simulation approach more robust and reliable. 
 
3.1 DemProj Module Inputs 
This module covers the following inputs which fit into the overall population processes, that is, fertility, 
mortality, and migration.  
 
3.1.1 First-year population 
The year 2001 is taken as the base year of the population. Its data is compiled from the 2001 census of 
India in single ages from 0 to 80 for both males and females which has been adjusted for the non-sampling 
errors. 
 
3.1.2 Total Fertility Rate (TFR) 
In the Demographic-As-Usual Scenario, we hypothetically assume the TFR to remain as high as 3.14 by 
2061 (at the base year level). However, the TFR has already reached the replacement level fertility 
(TFR=2.1) in 2020 and projected to reach 1.74 by 2060 (United Nations medium variant fertility projections, 
2019). We assume the same trend in the Demographic-Emphasis Scenario. 
 
3.1.3 Age distribution of fertility 
We assume the Age-Specific Fertility Rate (ASFR) at five years interval for the women in the age group 
15–49 years to remain unchanged in the Demographic-As-Usual Scenario. However, with the significant 
advancement in family planning programmes and the resulting decline in the fertility level in the country, 
there has been a dramatic shift in the lifetime births that occur at each age group (Goli et al., 2021). By 
using United Nations (2019) medium variant fertility projections, we observe in the Demographic-Emphasis 
Scenario that a majority of births are concentrated in the age group of 20–34 years for the period 2001–
2020. Family planning has helped in significantly reducing adolescent pregnancies (women in the age group 
of 15–19). But the trends in the distribution of births for the period 2020–2061 reveals that there will be a 
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further decline in births in the age group 20–24 also while those in the age group of 35-39 will see a 
moderate rise in births. 
 
3.1.4 Sex ratio at birth (SRB) 
The United Nations (2019) estimates reveal that the SRB in India in 2000 was 111 boys per hundred girls 
at birth due to strong-son preference and sex-selective abortion technologies (James, 2011; Bloom, 2011). 
Despite this, it is believed that rising urbanisation and improved status of women with rising literacy rate 
can improve SRB in future (Goli et al. 2021). We assume in the Demographic-Emphasis Scenario that SRB 
will improve and stabilize at 108 boys per hundred girls at birth by 2061, which is in line with the projections 
made by United Nations (2019). The status of SRB will remain unchanged in the Demographic-As-Usual 
Scenario. 
 
3.1.5 Life expectancy at birth (LEB) 
The LEB has shown a continuous upward trend during 2001–2020, rising sharply for females than that of 
males, thereby widening the gender gap in mortality. We consider the United Nations (2019) projections of 
LEB for males and females is approximately 75 years and 78 years respectively by 2061 in the 
Demographic-Emphasis Scenario while keeping the status quo in the Demographic-As-Usual Scenario. 
 
3.1.6 Model life tables 
Model life tables are used to generate mortality schedules. We choose UN South Asia as a regional model 
life table for population projection. Our assumption is in line with Stover, Heaton, and Ross (2006) and Goli 
et al. (2021) which found the South Asian model to be more consistent for mortality estimates for India.  
 
3.1.7 International migration 
A population projection accommodates migration as one of the three population processes. However, it can 
be ignored with no major effect on population projection (Spectrum Manual, 2019). In the context of India, 
a report of the technical group on population projection (2019) assumed constant net migration due to the 
absence of 2011 census migration tables. The committee found no significant effect of international 
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migration on population projection (Office of RGI & Census Commissioner, 2011). Considering these facts, 
we assume that migration pattern by sex will follow the United Nations approach which is built-in to 
Spectrum and loaded by default when we project. 
 
Methodology: Population projection by single ages 
DemProj module makes use of the standard cohort component projection method which requires a 
transformation of all inputs of base year population, fertility, mortality, and migration from 5 years age 
groups into single ages (Spectrum Manual, 2019). The Beers (1945) procedure is used to split 5 year age 
groups into single age groups. The formula for population projection by age and sex is as follows:  
 
Population a, s, t, j = Population a-1, s, t-1, j + 0.5 × (Migration a-1, s, t-1, j + Migration a, s, t, j) – Death a, s, t-1, j       (1) 
  
 Where a refers to the age, s refers to the sex, t refers to the time and j refers to the scenario. Thus, 
the Population a, s, t, j  refers to the population of particular sex (s) at age a at time t under jth scenario.  
 Death a, s, t-1, j refers to the number of deaths of particular sex (s) at age a from mid-year to mid-
year under the jth scenario. It is calculated as: 
 
Death a, s, t−1, t, j = Population a−1, s, t−1, j + 0.5 × (Migration a−1, s, t−1, j + Migration a, s, t, j)  
                                           × (1 − (Survival a−1, a, s, t−1, j + Survival a−1, a, s, t, j) × 0.5)                                    (2) 
 
 Where Survival a−1, a, s, t, j indicates age-specific survival rates between age a−1 and a for the 
person of particular sex (s =male or female). Now we estimate the number of births that occurred between 
two mid-years. It is calculated as: 
 
Birth t, t-1, j = ∑ [𝐹𝑃49𝑎=15 a, t-1, j + FP a, t, j × 0.5] × [TFR t-1, j + TFR t. j] × 0.5 




 Where FP a, t, j refers to the female population at age a and time t. ASFR a, t, j refers to the age-
specific fertility rate corresponding to age a at time t in the jth scenario. The number of births is multiplied 
by the corresponding Sex Ratio at Birth to estimate the number of female and male births. The births are 
then multiplied by their corresponding survival functions and the population in the age group 0–1 year is 
estimated as follows: 
         Population o, s, t, j = (Population o, s, t-1, j + Population o, s, t, j) × 0.5 × Survival o, s, t, j               (4) 
 
 Next, the final year population is estimated by using the same iterative procedure (that is 
replacing the population in the age zero and projecting for the subsequent years). 
 
3.2 RAPID Module Inputs 
RAPID module covers the inputs which examine the socio-economic impacts of population growth in an 
economy such as labour force and new job requirements, education, health, urbanization, and agriculture. 
The information on these inputs is then combined with the population projections (prepared with the 
DemProj module) to estimate the socio-economic requisites of a country to achieve its future policy targets 
in a given time frame (Spectrum Manual, 2019). 
 
3.2.1 Economy  
Economy input is one of the first demographic-economic linkages representing the labour supply effect. An 
increase in the proportion of the population in the working-age group leads to the rapid growth of the labour 
force and thereby expansion of the economy. But this happens only if the rate of job creation is greater than 
the expansion of the labour force. Spectrum RAPID module covers the following economy input indicators: 
labour force participation rate of aged 10–14 years and 15–64 years old of both sexes, and India’s base 
year GDP and annual percentage growth rate of GDP. These input indicators are critical factors in 
determining India’s potential to realize demographic dividend (Bloom et al., 2003; Bloom, 2011; 
Chandrasekhar et al., 2006; Desai, 2010; Goli & Pandey, 2010; James, 2008; James & Goli, 2016). The 
LFPR of aged 10–14 years of both sexes is obtained from different census rounds and duplicated for the 
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inter-census period. We assume that LFPR will continue to fall and reach 0.1 percentage by 2061 under 
the right socio-economic policy scenario due to India’s concerted actions to eradicate child labour. The 
main concerning issue emerging from the recent Periodic Labour Force Survey (PLFS) rounds is a decline 
in LFPR among 15–64 years old of both sexes. Around half of the working-age population in India is out of 
the labour market. The female LFPR in India is one of the lowest in the world and less than a quarter of 
them were active in the labour market in 2017–18. (PLFS Annual Report, 2017–18). Despite these trends, 
we assume that the LFPR of both males and females 15–64 years old will reach the benchmark set by the 
developed countries, that is, around 86 percent and 65 percent respectively, under the right socio-economic 
policy scenario. For GDP estimates, we take base year real GDP data from the statistics of the Reserve 
Bank of India (RBI). The annual real GDP growth rate of GDP during 2001–2018 is taken from the World 
Bank data. We target the future annual growth rate in 2061 to be 2 percentage under the right scenario, 
based on the GDP growth rate of large developed economies. Though GDP estimation of any nation is 
conditional on several economic, political, and health-related shocks (for instance, the impact of global 
COVID-19 pandemic), we take a hypothetical situation where these shocks are assumed to be absent and 
the long term goalpost is fixed based on GDP growth patterns in developed countries.     
 
3.2.2 Education  
Investments in human capital in the form of education is an important determinant of demographic dividend 
(Drummond, Thakoor, & Yu, 2014; Lutz et al., 2019). It was one of the most essential policy intervention in 
East Asia which helped in its ‘economic miracle’ (Bloom et al., 2003; Bloom, 2011). Spectrum software 
incorporates this important component of human capital effect by way of several input indicators related to 
education such as the age of entry into school, the number of years of schooling, the school enrolment 
rates of (in percentage), and the number of students per teacher, for both primary and secondary schools. 
The age of entry to primary and secondary schools in the base year (2001) was 6 and 13 years, 
respectively. The number of years of schooling for both primary and secondary schools is set at is 5 years. 
The data for gross enrolment ratio (GER) and the number of students per primary and secondary school 
teacher is collected from the Unified District Information System for Education (U-DISE) fact sheets [NIEPA 
(2017)]. We assume that the GER for both primary and secondary schools will be 100 percent by 2061, 
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given the current trend of remarkable progress in GER at the primary and secondary level (Economic 
Survey, 2018–19). We further assume that the government would target to achieve developed countries 
benchmark of student-teacher ratios to be around 13 by 2061 in their development plans.  
 
3.2.3 Health 
A healthy workforce, another important component of human capital, is essential to realize demographic 
dividend (Bloom & Williamson, 1998; Bloom et al., 2003; Bloom & Finlay, 2008; Bloom, 2011; Bloom et al., 
2015; Kelly & Schmidt, 2005). Health input in Spectrum includes the following indicators: population per 
doctor, population per nurse, population per health centre, population per hospital, population per hospital 
bed, and annual health expenditure per person. The data for these indicators during 2001–2018 is obtained 
from the World Development Indicators database. In the right scenario framework, we assume that the 
country will achieve the health standards of developed countries by 2061.  
 
3.2.4 Urbanization 
The Urbanization effect is considered by including input indicators on urbanization rate (percentage), 
percentage of the urban population in a major city, and persons per urban households. It has been found 
that the level of urbanisation is highly correlated with economic growth as it offers economies of scale, 
better employment opportunities, good education and health facilities, higher productivity, and induces 
lower fertility rates and, hence, higher participation of females in the labour market (Bloom et al., 2003; 
Bloom, 2011). But the experience of developing countries has shown that a rapid pace of urbanization may 
also result in substandard living conditions for the majority of urban dwellers. Thus, the nexus between 
urbanization and economic development is very complex to determine the actual impact on the living 
standard of urban people (Spectrum Manual, 2019). India is also experiencing a fast pace of urbanisation 
rate, expanding from 28 percentage in 2001 (Census, 2001) to 34% in the year 2018 (United Nations World 
Urbanisation Prospects, 2018). We assume that there will be around 70 percent of the total population living 
in urban areas, 100 percent of the urban population living in major cities and 2 persons per urban 






Agriculture is the main occupation sector of the Indian economy with around half of the labour force 
employed in it. Huge population pressure may over time reduce the amount of arable land per capita for 
food production in agriculture (Malthus effect) but the development of new technologies can boost yield 
(Boserup effect). These issues related to population pressure in the agriculture sector are addressed in the 
RAPID module by making standard assumptions to project the amount of arable land in agriculture, and 
the demand and supply of major crops (Spectrum Manual, 2019). 
  
Methodology: GDP and GDP per capita projection 
The annual rate of GDP growth is projected by assuming that GDP would increase at an exogenously 
specified growth rate, depending on historical trends and country-specific development plan, and not 
affected by the growth in population. Then GDP per capita is projected by dividing the projected GDP by 
the size of the population. This implies that a slower rate of population growth will lead to a rise in future 
GDP per capita level given constant economic growth.  In other words, there will be growth in per capita 
income provided GDP growth is higher than the growth in population (Spectrum Manual, 2019). 
                                   GDPt, j = GDPt-1, j × (1 + Annual GDP growtht, j)                                   (5) 
Where GDPt is the gross domestic product in time t under jth scenario. 
                             GDP per capitat, j = GDPt, j / Projected total populationt, j                                         (6) 
Where GDP per capitat, j is the estimated GDP per capita in time t under jth scenario. 
 
4. Results and Discussion 
Effective demographic Windows of opportunity for India 
The United Nations defines demographic windows of opportunity as a period when the proportion 
of children aged less than 15 years and the proportion of the people 65 years and older fall below 30 percent 
and 15 percent of the population respectively. We project windows of opportunity for India using this 
definition by taking the year 2001 as the start of our simulation period. Figure 2 shows that India’s working-
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age population (aged 15 – 64) will increase by 8 percentage points during 2001 – 2036 and after that, it will 
start shrinking. The estimated child population (aged 0-14) will continue to fall during the entire simulation 
period whereas the old age population (aged 65+) will continue to rise and after 2056, the old age population 
will take over the child population in size. This pattern of demographic transition in India reveals that the 
proportion of children (aged less than 15 years) has reached below 30 percent of the population after 2011 
and the proportion of the old age people (65 years and older) will fall below 15 percent of the population 
before 2046. But the trends in demographic dependency ratio4 (Figure 3) point out that the overall 
dependency ratio will start rising after 2041 due to an increase in the old-age dependency, offsetting the 
fall in child dependency. Thus, the effective demographic windows of opportunity for India is available for 
the period between 2011 and 2041, giving India roughly 30 years of demographic bonus. This phase is 
known as ‘First Demographic Dividend’ which will give a boost to per capita income. The period after 2041, 
when the ageing burden starts, may provide the possibility of the ‘Second Demographic Dividend’ as the 
older population aids in capital accumulation from the savings done during their working years and thereby 
contributing to economic growth. However, it hinges on the availability of developed financial markets, 
healthy older population, provision of income security and social security, which at present seems to be a 
formidable task in India. 
Some of the previous empirical evidence on the demographic windows of opportunity for India has 
concluded its onset in the 1970s (Aiyar & Mody, 2011; Naveentham & Dharmalingam, 2012), 1980s 
(Ladusingh & Narayana, 2011; Mason, 2005; Mitra & Nagarajan, 2005; Naveentham, 2002), 1990s (Bloom 
& Williamson, 1998; Mason, Lee, & Lee, 2010), 2000s (Bloom & Finlay, 2008) and to the latest period 2015 
(Goli & Pandey, 2010). Our estimates of the onset of the demographic window of opportunity for India lies 
somewhere in the middle of the estimates by Bloom and Finlay (2008), and Goli and Pandey (2010). 
Regarding the closing of the demographic window, most of the previous studies have found it somewhere 
around the mid-2020s (Bloom & Williamson, 1998; Mason et al. 2010; Naveentham, 2002), mid-2030s 
(Ladusingh & Narayana, 2011; Mitra & Nagarajan, 2005; Naveentham & Dharmalingam, 2012) and 2040s 
 
4 It is the ratio of the number of persons aged less than 15 years and 65 years and more to those aged 15-64 years 
(United Nations, 2019). 
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(Aiyar & Mody, 2011; Goli & Pandey, 2010; Mason, 2005), and 2050s (Bloom & Finlay, 2008). Our finding 
is in line with the studies by Aiyar and Mody (2011), Goli and Pandey (2010), and Mason (2005).  
 
The magnitude of demographic dividend 
The demographic dividend is reckoned when India’s possible real GDP per capita by 2061 is compared 
across two scenarios in the simulation modelling exercise. Under the Demographic-As-Usual Scenario, 
where the same demographic environment would continue as in the base year 2001 along with continued 
investment in socio-economic policies to achieve goalpost 2061, would produce a 9-time increase in real 
GDP per capita during 2001- 2061, rising from 42,000 rupees in 2001 to about 382,000 rupees in 2061 
(Figure 4). Whereas under the Demographic Emphasis Scenario, by taking demographic projections as per 
UN (2019) medium variant fertility projections along with the assumption of the right socio-economic 
environment in place by 2061, the real GDP per capita would go up by 12.8 times during 2001- 2061, raising 
it to the level of 548,000 rupees in 2061. Hence, adding favourable age-structural transition (more people 
in the working-age group relative to dependents) to the desirable requisite socio-economic policies in terms 
of economy, employment, education, health, urbanization, and agriculture creates a demographic dividend 
of over 165,000 rupees (almost additional 43 percentage) in terms of GDP per capita by 2061. Further in-
depth analysis of India’s real GDP per capita projections due to demographic dividend for every 5 years 
interval shown in Table 2 highlights the rapidly rising size of potential demographic dividend if India could 
capitalize on its demographic transition.  
 We benchmark our GDP estimates by comparing them to the nominal GDP projections by 
Bloomberg Economics (Figure 5). For the year 2025, our nominal GDP projected value of 334 trillion 
rupees5 is very close to the figures (370 trillion rupees)6 reported by Bloomberg Economics (Bloomberg 
Economics, 2019).  
 
 
5 Our real GDP estimate is converted to nominal GDP by using formula: Nominal GDP= GDP Deflator × Real GDP. 
We have assumed the same GDP deflator value in 2025 as it is in 2021 that is 146.10 (Source: Ministry of Statistics 
and Programme Implementation, MOSPI. 





For over two decades, economists and demographers have tried estimating the magnitude of demographic 
dividend for India and the demographic window of opportunity available by considering the period before 
2000. However, the country’s age-structural transition reveals that India’s favourable demographic phase 
began only after 2000. Hence, the estimation of demographic divided after the onset of windows of 
opportunity assumes greater importance. Further, our simulation modelling is capable of demonstrating that 
the size of our demographic dividend is conditional on the non-demographic factors by considering various 
demographic-economic linkages through which fertility decline and consequent changes in the age-
structure of the population affects economic growth. Two main findings from our simulation exercise are: 
First, the effective demographic windows of opportunity for India is available for the period between 2011 
and 2041, giving India roughly 30 years of demographic bonus. It is the period where the maximum of the 
first demographic dividend can be reaped before the ageing burden starts. Second, the demographic 
emphasis scenario creates a demographic dividend of over 165,000 rupees (almost an additional 43 
percentage) in terms of GDP per capita by 2061 when compared to the demographic as-usual scenario, 
solely as a result of favourable age-structural transition and supporting socio-economic policy environment 
in terms of investment in human capital, family planning, decent employment opportunities, the rapid pace 
of urbanization, and agricultural growth.  
Though we have benchmarked our simulation results to the findings of previous empirical studies 
and standard GDP projection by Bloomberg Economics, there is still scope for further improvement in our 
simulation modelling due to the following reasons: First, we could not control for life cycle savings effect as 
one of the crucial channels of demographic-economic linkages due to absence of savings and capital 
formation input in our simulation modelling. Second, our simulation modelling could have been more robust 
if could control for the effects of multiple productive sectors such as industry and services. Third, we could 
not allow for endogenous changes in fertility as a result of changes in income. However, Ashraf et al. (2013) 
found that there is no exact measurement by which fertility should respond to changes in income and this 
effect is found to be modest in their analysis. Fourth, we could not control for the impact of additional 
possible determinants of economic growth in our models such as the labour market flexibility, Information 
and Communication Technologies use, financial market efficiency, public institutions (efficiency of 
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governance), openness to international trade, and investment in basic infrastructure. Fifth, we could not 
disentangle the relative effects of diverse demographic-economic channels on economic growth and is 
worth investigating for future research work. Finally, we could not consider feedback effects among 
population growth, human capital accumulation, technological progress, and GDP growth. 
Nevertheless, we have presented Spectrum-based simulation as a planning tool that makes it more 
reliable and transparent by including vast demographic-economic indicators, supported by economic theory 
and macro empirical evidence, and setting standard goalpost assumptions for the input indicators. It gives 
a strong message to the policymakers that when paired together, a favourable age-structure and a 
combined scenario of investment in family planning, human capital, decent employment opportunities, and 
well planned institutional reforms, could produce the best results. 
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Table 1: Summary of the magnitude of demographic dividend and demographic windows of opportunity from previous studies in the 
Indian context.  










Bloom and Williamson, 1998 1965-1990 1.34* 1.38* 
(estimated for 
1990-2025) 
Conditional Barro Convergence Model (OLS) 
Mitra and Nagarajan, 2005 1950-2050 NA 1980–2035 United Nations World Population Prospects 2002 
data on the relative share of the working-age group 
Mason, 2005 1950-2050 0.14* 1985–2045* National Transfer Accounts Method based on life-
cycle approach (Lee and Mason Model) 
James, 2008 1971-2001 24.19 (4.19) NA Conditional Barro Convergence Model (IV 
specification) 
Bloom and Finlay, 2008 1965-2005 1.02 0.67 (estimated 
for 2005-2050) 
Conditional Barro Convergence Model (OLS) 
Mason, Lee, and Lee, 2010 1890-2100 18# 1990-2025 National Transfer Accounts Method based on life-
cycle approach (Lee and Mason Model) 
Goli and Pandey, 2010 1951-2050 NA 2015–2040 United Nations World Population Prospects 2002 and 
UN’s definition for windows of opportunity 
Bloom, Canning, Hu, Liu, Mahal, 
and Yip, 2010 
1960-2000 0.7 NA Conditional Barro Convergence Model (2SLS) 
Ladusingh and Narayana, 2011 1980-2295  9.1# 1980–2035 National Transfer Accounts Method based on life-
cycle approach (Lee and Mason Model) 
Aiyar and Mody, 2011 1961-2001 2.48 (1.03) 1970–2040 Conditional Barro Convergence Model (OLS 
specification) 
Thakur, 2012 1981-2011 - 0.02 (0.94) NA Conditional Barro Convergence Model (OLS 
specification) 
Naveentham and Dharmalingam, 
2012 
1950-2040 0.4 1970–2030 Difference between the growth rates of the working 
age population (25–59) and the total population 
Kumar, 2013 1971-2001 2.72 (1.16) NA Conditional Barro Convergence Model (OLS 
specification) 
Ghosh, 2016 1961-2011 0.3 (0.10) 1.56 (projected 
till 2026)  
Conditional Barro Convergence Model (2SLS) 
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Joe, Kumar, and Rajpal, 2018 1980-2010 0.45 (1.57) NA  Conditional Barro Convergence Model (OLS 
specification) 
NA means not available.  
The standard error is reported in parenthesis in column 3.  
# Income per effective consumer estimates for a first demographic dividend. 
* Regional estimate for South Asia. Bloom (2011, p. 11) has noted that India’s demographic indicators are similar to those of the South Asian region as a whole.
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Table 2: Projections of India’s Real GDP per capita and share of demographic dividend 
Real GDP per capita (thousand rupees) 
Year Demographic-As-Usual Scenario  Demographic Emphasis Scenario  Demographic Dividend 
2001 42.55 42.55 – 
2006 53.34 53.69 0.35 
2011 68.84 70.45 1.61 
2016 86.95 90.85 3.9 
2021 113.69 121.3 7.61 
2026 143.77 156.67 12.9 
2031 177.79 198.63 20.84 
2036 214.65 247.34 32.69 
2041 253.02 302.27 49.25 
2046 291.27 362.05 70.78 
2051 327.02 424.68 97.66 
2056 358.64 487.73 129.09 
2061 382.75 548.6 165.85 
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